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WHEN EXPERIENCE BECOMES HISTORY:
SEXISM, RACISM, AND THE JUDICIAL MIND
Judith A. Baer*
SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE

CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011). Pp. 369. $39.95.
One generation's news becomes the next generation's history. The scholar reads
in the archives what the participant got from experience and the observer got from the
media. Serena Mayeri's first book focuses on events familiar to second-wave feminists,
especially those who, like this reviewer, were both students and activists at the time.
Mayeri, a professor of law and history at the University of Pennsylvania, seeks to
"uncover[] the myriad ways that Americans reconfigured the relationship between racial
injustice, sex inequality, and the law in the 1960s and 1970s."I The task she has set for
herself takes her through much of the late twentieth century feminist history. She has
read voluminous papers and archives and has explored biographies, memoirs, legal
briefs, contemporary accounts, office memoranda, court decisions, and just about every
available primary and secondary source. Reasoningfrom Race began as Mayeri's Ph.D.
dissertation. The highest praise I can give this book is to report that acquiring this
information required a web search. The book's provenance cannot be guessed from the
research, the writing, the argument, or the theme. Mayeri has produced a sophisticated,
nuanced, lucidly written, and thoroughly professional study. She excels at both of her
disciplines. Her future work promises to be worth reading.
The task of turning a dissertation into a book requires a transition from writing for
people who know more than the author to writing for people who know less. The
specialist in recent history does not leave the first type of audience behind. The faculty
committee is replaced by readers who recall both the script and the cast and retain their
own interpretations of them, filtered through time and distance and not necessarily
recollected in tranquility. The historian may have much to teach the witness. Hindsight
confers advantages: the ability to discern a new tune from familiar words, to sort
information, to find order in jumble, to see patterns in retrospect, and to ask new
questions of the material. Reasoningfrom Race meets these challenges. But the witness
is tempted to look for what the author gets wrong. This type of reader is predisposed to
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the reviewer's critical stance. Research is a better tool than memory for ascertaining
facts, but not necessarily for identifying all the relevant facts. Factual errors of omission
are more common and more serious than errors of commission, which can be corrected
in later printings. Mayeri's specific errors of omission consist of inattention to the details
of constitutional and legal texts. This inattention leads to significant misunderstandings
that weaken the force of this book. Mayeri approaches mastery of her subject, but she
falls short of achieving it.
"The African American quest for civil rights has become so deeply ingrained in
American consciousness that it is the yardstick against which all other reform
movements are measured." 2 This yardstick has been and remains problematic for gender
equality. Racial injustice arrived in North America soon after the first English settlers.
African slavery antedated all the original thirteen colonies. It lasted from 1619, more or
less, to 1863.3 Not until 2107 will we have lived without slavery as long as we have
lived with it. The oppression of women, including forced migration, has also been
present since Europeans settled in North America.4 But slavery was a peculiar institution
from the beginning, while traditional gender arrangements were an accepted part of life.
The racial analogy is particularly powerful with respect to the adjudicating of cases and
the making of laws. An active feminist movement existed by the end of the Civil War,
but Frederick Douglass's proclamation of "the Negro's hour" ended any hope of
combining women's voting rights with those of black men. 5 The history of Jim Crow
laws needs no retelling, but the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
ceased to be "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments" 6 by the time the women's
movement resurfaced in the late 1960s. Racial classifications were "constitutionally
suspect," and could survive strict scrutiny only after meeting "a heavy burden of
justification." 7 They were, in effect, presumed invalid. Sex, however, was still a valid
basis for classification.8 The title of Pauli Murray and Mary Eastwood's path breaking
article said it all: Jane Crow and the Law.9 It is exactly this "reasoning from race" that

2. Id. at 2.
3.

PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-1877, at 3 (Hill & Wang 1993).

4. ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL, 15-27 (Holt, Rinehart, & Winston 1980) (reporting that English
women, arrested for theft, vagrancy, or prostitution, were often "released" from jail onto ships).
5. See Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Letter to the Editor, This is the Negro's Hour, NAT'L ANTI-SLAVERY
STANDARD, Dec. 30, 1865.
6. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a state statute that
authorized sterilization of the "feeble-minded").
7. See, for example, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), where the Supreme Court took a circuitous
route and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). The Korematsu Court, of course, did the opposite
of what it said. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (upholding the congressional order
excluding people of Japanese ancestry after stating racial classifications are subject to "the most rigid
scrutiny"); see Walter F. Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Japanese American Cases: A Study in the Uses of
Stare Decisis, 11 WESTERN POL. Q. 3,4-5, 13 (1958).
8.

JUDITH A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR

LEGISLATION 5, 70-77, 107-08 (1978) (describing the significance of the Court's sex classifications in both
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937)); see also
Hoyt v. Florida., 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (rejecting a constitutional claim that the state statute excluded women
from jury service); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding state law that prohibited women from
bartending).
9. Pauli Murray & Mary 0. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discriminationand Title VII, 34 GEO.
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was so costly and yet so inevitable.
The task confronting a lawyer who took on an equal protection case involving sex
discrimination was to convince courts to move from the "sex is a valid basis for
classification" doctrine, closer to the "suspect classification" doctrine on race
discrimination. This burden fell to Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the ACLU's Women's Rights
11
Project. 10 As a Supreme Court Justice, she is still working on this task forty years later.
The compromise standard has been entrenched since 1976: "[C]lassifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." 1 2 The Court's rejection of strict scrutiny in favor of
intermediate scrutiny has remained constant. 13
By 1980, two distinct judicial positions had emerged on the analogy between
sexism and racism. Justice Brennan's opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson recommended
making sex a suspect classification. 14 He recounted how "our statute books gradually
became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed,
throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many
15
respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes." Justice
Powell, however, insisted five years later that "the perception of racial classifications as
inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based
classifications do not share." 1 6 Neither statement articulates binding constitutional
doctrine; Justice Brennan was one vote short of a majority,1 7 and Justice Powell's
remark was dicta.1 8 But they are important expressions of a tension that persists to the
present.
Justice Brennan's statement was qualified. He did not "lump together" sexism and
racism, as second-wave feminists were often accused of doing. He made a familiar
comparison that Justice Powell rejected. Typical critics of the analogy argued that racial
inequality and gender inequality were different in degree: racism was worse than sexism.
This criticism ignored the fact that minority women confronted both types of inequality
19
at once. Justice Powell declared that sexism and racism are different, but was he
positing a difference in degree or a difference in kind? If the former, we may roll our
eyes and think "here we go again." If the latter, Justice Powell's statement is difficult to
dispute. Racial and sexual inequality may share a similar history, but they do not have
the same history. Both histories are lengthy and may be equally tragic, but they are not
tragic in the same way.
WASH. L. REv. 232 (1965-1966).
10. Amy Leigh Campbella, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU Women's Rights Project,
11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 157, 162-63 (2002).
11. See id. at 163.
12. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Craig,429 U.S.
190.
14. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion).
15. Id. at 685.
16. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978).
17. See Frontiero,411 U.S. 677.
18. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 303.
19. See id
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The dangers and limits of reasoning from race go far beyond gender equality.
Mayeri begins and ends the book, not with comparisons between race and gender, but
with the relationship between minority rights and same-sex marriage. It is impossible to
think about this issue without recalling Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court's ruling
that invalidated prohibitions against interracial marriage. 20 But Mayeri twice quotes a
law professor who insists that opposition to same-sex marriage arises not from
"prejudice and bigotry," but from the desire for "the kind of meaningful gender identities
that traditional marriage seems to offer." 2 1 The support among African American voters
for California's Proposition 8 in 200822 and North Carolina's constitutional amendment
in 201223 suggests that this desire exists in diverse segments of American society. To the
feminist reader, of whatever race, this sort of rhetoric has a familiar ring. It evokes the
Moynihan Report of 1965, which found a "[t]angle of [p]athology" in the black family
caused by "a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out of line with the rest of the
American society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a
crushing burden on the Negro male and, in consequence, on a great many Negro women
as well."24 In the mid-1960s, one did not criticize the Moynihan Report; one faced up to
its implications. By 1970, the feminist and black power movements had challenged this
white male orthodoxy. But criticism did not make the orthodoxy go away; it continues to
affect public policy.
Many second-wave feminists regard traditional marriage roles as examples of
prejudice and bigotry, and as remnants of a tragic history. While the Supreme Court has
never endorsed this view, it went so far as to reject "old notions" and "stereotyped
characterizations" as bases for gender discrimination on its way to a formal invalidation
of traditional marriage law.25 Without treating sex exactly like race, the Justices
perceived the gross, stereotyped distinctions underlying family law. The Craig v. Boren
standard of intermediate scrutiny 26 has produced significant gains in women's rights, and
this is no small achievement. What the Court has been unable or unwilling to do is to
reject discrimination based, however dubiously, on factors that are not stereotyped
characterizations - notably women's childbearing capacity. From Michael M in 1981
through Tuan Anh Nguyen in 2001, the Court has upheld laws like these.27 When the
20. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
21. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 2, 225 (quoting Professor Richard Thompson of Stanford Law).
22. Shelby Grad, 70% of African Americans Backed Prop. 8, Exit Poll Finds, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008,
12:10 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2008/1l/70-of-african-a.html.
23. Michael Gordon, Amendment One: N.C. Voters Approve Measure to Block Same-Sex Marriage,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 9, 2012), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/05/08/3227863/amendmentone-nc-voters-approve.html.
24. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, in THE MOYNIHAN
REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 39, 75 (Lee Rainwater & William L. Yancey eds., 1967). The

report repeatedly refers to a family with a "female-head," not a "single-parent" family. See id. at 63.
25. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 458-61 (1981); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-17 (1975);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-88 (1973).
26. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
27. See Nguyen v. INS., 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Michael M v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464
(1981). See also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (requiring additional proof of parentage from an
illegitimate child bom abroad when the parent with citizenship was the father and not the mother). Cf Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding, under the Craig standard, the male-only draft registration
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racial analogy is useless, the judiciary is compliant.
Mayeri ably shows that the failure to treat sexism as seriously as racism is not the
only problem with constitutional doctrine. In two important respects, race and sex have
been treated alike since the 1970s to the detriment of the equal protection doctrine. First,
the Court neutralized inequality into classification and discrimination.28 Judges and
lawyers did not speak of white supremacy, male supremacy, oppression, or inferior
treatment, but of classification by race or gender. 29 The Court has refused to distinguish
between invidious and benign discrimination. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Craig
marked the last occasion any Justice made a distinction between discrimination against
women and discrimination against men. 30 Justice Powell declared in Bakke, "[r]acial and
ethnic classifications of any sort are inherently suspect, and thus call for the most
exacting judicial examination."31 This neutrality made it easy to presume that
discrimination in favor of the disadvantaged was just as bad as discrimination against
them, a conclusion that is not required by text, history, or logic. Secondly, the Court has
required that discrimination be deliberate; disparate impact does not count unless there is
evidence of intent.32 Washington v. Davis upheld a testing requirement for aspiring
police officers, 33 and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney upheld a veterans'
preference, 34 despite the fact that the rule in Washington disproportionately excluded
35
African Americans and the rule in Feeney, women.
It is at this point in the argument that Mayeri appears to have conflated
constitutional interpretation and statutory construction. Under "Disparate impact theory,"
the index lists Dothard v. Rawlinson, Geduldig v. Aiello, General Electric v. Gilbert,
Griggs v. Duke Power Company and PersonnelAdministratorv. Feeney.36 The last case
37
does not belong here. It was brought under the Equal Protection Clause, whereas all the
other rulings were based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.38 Title VII refers
39
directly to discrimination on the basis of race and sex, not to denial of equality.
Furthermore, disparate impact has been accepted as evidence of employment
discrimination since the Griggs decision in 1971.40 No showing of intent is necessary.
Mayeri describes Washington v. Davis as a "severe blow" to disparate impact theory,41

requirement, and demonstrating traditional judicial deference to Congress with respect to the military).
28. See Fontiero,411 U.S. at 688.
29. Id. at 687-88.
30. Craig,429 U.S. at 219-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
32. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. V. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
33. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-52 (1976).
34. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 280-81.
35. Id. at 269; Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
36. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 355.
37. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259.
38. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323 (1977); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-28
(1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1971).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
40. See, e.g., Dothard,433 U.S. at 329; Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405,417 (1975).
41. MAYERI, supra note 1, at i10.
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but in fact it was merely a refusal to incorporate Title VII into the equal protection
guarantee. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act use different words,
have different purposes, and have emerged from different contexts. I agree with Mayeri
that intent should not be required for a Fourteenth Amendment violation - after all,
Section I guarantees "equal protection of the laws,"42 not "immunity from intentional
unequal treatment"- but Title VII is not an authoritative source of the equal protection
doctrine. Even if one accepts the attitudinal model of judicial decision making, the belief
that judges decide cases on the basis of their personal preferences does not entail the
conclusion that they vote only on this basis. 43
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 started with race and color, progressed to religion,
and, in a bizarre attempt at "[sinking] the bill under gales of laughter," 44 added sex to the
list of prohibited classifications in its section on employment discrimination. 4 5 Described
as a "joke" by commentators46 and a "fluke" by the first director of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 4 7 the sex provision of Title VII has been treated
by the Commission and the courts as anything but a joke or fluke. Mayeri's treatment of
statutory cases dispels, once and for all, the familiar canard that early second-wave
feminists cared only about the interests of white, middle-class, educated women.48 This
feminist cohort included minority women like Pauli Murray, 49 Aileen Hernandez, and
Dorothy Height. 50 The same lawyers who were active in the much-maligned National
Organization for Women argued cases on behalf of blue-collar women workers like
Lorena Weeks, Leah Rosenfeld, and Ida Phillips. 5 1 While civil rights activists and their
feminist counterparts exchanged criticisms, both groups sought cooperation; for
example, "[fleminists used the Phillips case to make common cause with the civil rights
movement."52 Victories like these helped working women regardless of their race or
class. Outside Mayeri's time period, landmark cases on maternity leave and sexual
harassment were won by African American women Lillian Garland and Mechelle

42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. See, inter alia, HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL:
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 15-22 (1999) (describing the "preferential model"

as the belief that judicial decision-making is largely based on personal preference). There is no evidence that
Mayeri accepts this model; she neither discusses it nor cites it.
44. CAROLINE BIRD & SARA WELLES BRILLER, BORN FEMALE: THE HIGH COST OF KEEPING WOMEN

DOwN 5 (David McKay Co. 1968).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a)(1) (2012).
46. Jo FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION: A CASE STUDY OF AN EMERGING SOCIAL
MOVEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE POLICY PROCESS 53 (1975).

47. Id. at 54.
48. See MAYERI, supra note 1, at 194-98.
49. See id. at 223, 226 (describing Murray's efforts to unite the movements for both gender and racial
equality).
50. See Duchess Harris, From the Kennedy Commission to the Combahee Collective: Black Feminist
Organizing, 1960-80, in SISTERS IN THE STRUGGLE: AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS-

BLACK POWER MOVEMENT 280, 285-87 (Bettye Collier-Thomas & V.P. Franklin eds., 2001) (discussing the
roles of both Aileen Hernandez and Dorothy Height in the civil rights movement).
51. Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219
(C.D. Cal. 1968); Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967); MAYERI, supra note 1,
at 30-33.
52. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 54.
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Vinson. 53 "Parallels to race helped judges to see sexual abuse of women in the
workplace as discrimination based on sex.,54
"Explain what unfair thing was done to you and how others were treated
differently." 55 This sentence, which headed the blank space on the EEOC charge form
56
during Mayeri's time frame, states the essence of a claim of unequal treatment. If the
charging party was a woman and the "others" were men, a sex discrimination charge was
straightforward. If, as in Ida Phillips's case, the "others" were not men but differently
situated women, the case was more complex but still manageable. But what happens if
discriminatory treatment is based on both sex and race? "In a way, African American
women were too successful in universalizing their experience: once women of all races
could claim violation, the particular underpinnings of black women's claims were
obscured." 57 Judges, once persuaded to treat sex like race, forgot both the ways in which
race and sex differed and the ways in which they combined. This linear, either-or model
has limited the force of both constitutional and statutory law.
In a chapter entitled "Lost Intersections," Mayeri recounts several instances in
which black women suffered sexual harassment based partly on their race and courts
dismissed their race discrimination complaint.58 She devotes much of this chapter to the
case of Katie Mae Andrews, an African American woman who was denied a job as a
59
teacher's aide in Drew, Mississippi in 1972 because she was a single mother. The
record contained abundant evidence that the superintendent's refusal to hire unwed
60
mothers was "part of a larger backlash against civil rights." The rule obviously had a
disparate impact on African American women, but the plaintiffs "struggled to explain
how the rule was racially discriminatory without suggesting that African American
culture somehow encouraged or condoned 'schoolgirl pregnancies.',61 By the time the
case got to court, it had morphed into an equal protection claim, rendering the disparate
62
impact theory irrelevant.
But this whole discussion - and the sources on which it is based - ignores a
crucial part of Title VII. It is illegal for employers to discriminate on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin" except "where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise."63 This phrase is an implicit invitation to weaken anti53. Respectively, California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and
CentrifugalForces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse,33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263, 315-18
(2000).
54. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 145 (citation omitted).
55. See Hicks v. ABT Assoc., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 962 (3d Cir. 1978).
56. It now reads, "The particulars are:" EEOC, CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION, FORM 5, available at
hup://www.wylielaw.com/eeocform.pdf.
57. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 145.
58. Id. at 144-67.
59. Id. at 145-53.
60. Id. at 146.
61. Id. at 158-59.
62. See id. at 151.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (e) (2012).
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discrimination law; the authoritative source for information about a particular business is
the employer, not the employee. But the word "race" is missing from the qualification.
Race is never a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ"). There is no such thing as
"race plus" anything: pregnancy, motherhood, fertility, racially inappropriate behavior,
or, for that matter, sex. 64 For some reason, no one mentioned in this book seems to have
noticed this difference in textual language.65 Nor does Mayeri mention it. Her account
reveals how the failure to notice textual language has effectively nullified Title VII as a
remedy where both sex and race discrimination are present. Analysis of this failure
would have vastly enhanced the import and value of this study.
These criticisms are not trivial. But the book's weaknesses do not render it
insignificant. We can expect much more from an author who produces a study of this
caliber early in her career. Mayeri's work is essential to an understanding of law, history,
feminist theory, and social science. What is depressing is the fact that the limited judicial
reasoning she illuminates remains in place thirty years later, long after feminist
jurisprudence left it behind. Angela Harris's critique of gender essentialism, Kimberle
Crenshaw's exploration of intersectionality, and Mari Matsuda's call for multiple
consciousness are absent from court decisions.66 Given the entrenched conservatism of
federal appellate courts, this absence is unsurprising. But these authors are read by law
students who become clerks and eventually judges. Mayeri's explanation of what went
wrong and the availability of alternative theories provide grounds for cautious optimism.

64. Sex-plus discrimination against pregnant workers is not per se a violation of antidiscrimination law,
but neither does pregnancy confer a blank check on employers. The EEOC upheld regulations prohibiting
women from working as flight attendants in late pregnancy, but a federal appeals court invalidated a regulation
barring any pregnant woman from working as a flight attendant. Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 996
(5th Cir. 1984.) The other Title VII cases are, respectively Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187
(1991) (discrimination based on fetal protection policy); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
(discrimination in partnership decision); Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (discrimination
based on having pre-school aged children). The first two cases lie outside Mayeri's time frame, and Hopkins
was not even a BFOQ case. I include them because they are apt illustrations of the differences between sex and
race discrimination under Title VII.
65. The political scientist may be forgiven for mentioning that Andrews was awarded the back pay she sued
for; she did not ask to be hired by the district. Katie Mae Andrews Peacock went on to teach in several
Mississippi schools until her death in 2009. MAYERI, supra,note 1, at 235.
66. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection ofRace and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989);
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 7heory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1989-1990); Mari J.
Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTs.
L. REP. 7 (1989).
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